Scientists are increasingly deploying advanced artificial intelligence models to synthesize novel viral pathogens never before observed in nature. The trend has sparked optimism for groundbreaking medical therapies alongside acute concerns over biosecurity risks, according to recent policy and scientific analyses.
AI Accelerates the Creation of Novel Viral Pathogens
The intersection of machine learning and dual-use biotechnology has accelerated the pace at which researchers can conceptualize and construct biological agents. Laboratories harness these computational tools to map protein structures and invent life-saving treatments. Yet defense analysts point out that the exact same capabilities lower technical hurdles for designing sophisticated biological weapons.
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention Under Pressure
Managing biological risks requires evaluating how emerging technologies interact with longstanding international frameworks, such as the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which restricts the development and stockpiling of biological agents.
Biological weapons have historically proven easy to manufacture but difficult to deploy effectively due to severe operational constraints and unpredictable contagion risks that threaten attackers as much as targets, according to policy research from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Presidential Commitments Required from Major Powers
Analysts warn that artificial intelligence could streamline the design phase of advanced pathogens. Addressing these risks involves determining whether to supplement existing arms control treaties with specific political commitments.
A viable framework would require a direct commitment at the presidential level from major nuclear powers—specifically the United States, China, and Russia—to prohibit research that employs artificial intelligence for the creation of advanced biological weapons, according to CEPA.
Geopolitical Divergence Stalls Arms Control
Securing formal international agreements on artificial intelligence limits remains difficult due to divergent geopolitical priorities and a current lack of institutional mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral negotiation.
Historical precedents, such as the arms control negotiations that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis, demonstrated that formal agreements depend on a shared perception of catastrophic risk and a unified desire among world leaders to address it.
Narrow High-Level Engagement as the Path Forward
At present, major powers hold conflicting views on AI governance. Russian officials have not clarified their long-term regulatory approach, according to CEPA.
Chinese leadership has expressed concern over the weaponization of artificial intelligence but maintains that risks can be managed without halting domestic technological development. Furthermore, experts emphasize that broadening negotiations to include too many participants—such as through the United Nations or expansive Davos-style forums—often dilutes the focus and prevents binding consensus. Effective negotiations likely require narrow, high-level engagement among the primary nuclear-armed states to establish meaningful technical guardrails and political consent.
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