Indonesia’s Evolving Foreign Policy Under Prabowo: Balancing Ambition with Constraints
For decades, Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy doctrine was understood as the archipelago’s effort to shield itself from great power competition. Under President Prabowo Subianto, still, Indonesia is now entering a new stage of geostrategic expansion. Subianto’s approach is a more proactive one: opening geopolitical access to various global power centers as widely as possible, without forming formal alliance commitments.
Such a strategy is generally known as multi-alignment. It is an approach that seeks to maximize room for maneuver through diversifying strategic partners. In other words, Subianto is trying to steer Indonesia beyond simply avoiding taking sides into positioning itself at the center of the interaction of competing powers. This approach, however, operates within a context marked by the US-China rivalry and the return of Russia as a balancing actor, creating both opportunities and a complex configuration of expectations.
Crouching Dragon, Hidden Tension
As early as 2020, surveys indicated that Indonesians viewed China as the most dominant power in Asia. The Jakarta Post reported this perception. Given that China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner and one of its biggest foreign investors, the relationship is a key pillar in Indonesia’s foreign policy configuration. The Lowy Institute highlights the significance of this economic tie.
Indonesia has consistently asserted sovereignty over the Natuna Islands and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) while avoiding confrontational rhetoric regarding China’s nine-dash line claim. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute notes this approach has allowed Jakarta to avoid escalation and maintain stable economic relations with Beijing. This ambiguity, however, is open to interpretation. China may view Jakarta’s caution as implicit acknowledgment of the issue’s sensitivity, while Washington or Moscow might see it as an effort to maintain autonomy without aligning with Beijing.
The joint statement issued during Subianto’s first visit to China in November 2024 drew scrutiny. The Lowy Institute’s Interpreter reported that the document referred to an “important common understanding” on joint development in areas of overlapping claims and proposed an intergovernmental committee to explore cooperation in the South China Sea. This language raised concerns as Indonesia had previously rejected China’s maritime claims as lacking legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a stance reinforced by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. Fulcrum details the context of this ruling.
Although Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that Jakarta does not recognize the nine-dash line, the wording of the joint statement provides Beijing with an opportunity to frame the episode as tacit regional acceptance of its claims. ASPI observed this potential outcome.
Further amplifying this ambiguity, Subianto proposed a joint-development proposal to manage regional tensions in the South China Sea at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in April 2025. Antara News reported that Subianto stated Indonesia and China mutually respect each other’s legal positions and should cooperate given the overlapping maritime areas. Beijing did not dismiss the proposal and in April 2025, China held its first 2+2 ministerial dialogue with Indonesia. The Diplomat covered this development.
A 2025 survey revealed that many Indonesians consider China’s actions in the South China Sea a threat to Indonesia and ASEAN. Kompas reported that 76% of respondents held this view. China’s grey-zone tactics have been applied against Indonesia for years, and extending ambiguous acknowledgement of China’s nine-dash claim could undermine regional stability.
The Cranes Are Flying East Again
Indonesia’s accession to BRICS in early 2025 and its dynamics with Russia represent another configuration of its foreign policy. This bilateral dynamic received scrutiny following reports that Russia requested access to Indonesia’s military base in Papua in mid-2025. Politico covered Australia’s immediate concerns. The Indonesian government firmly denied any plans to provide military bases to Russia. Tempo reported on this denial.
While Jakarta’s clarification aligns with Indonesia’s non-alignment principle, the issue indicates Russia views Indonesia as a potential partner for expanding its global presence. Indonesia and Russia enjoy close defense relations and technical cooperation, including their first joint naval drill in November 2024. Asia Times provided coverage of this exercise. Indonesia also skipped the G7 summit in June 2025 to sign a strategic partnership with Russia in St. Petersburg. Deutsche Welle reported on this decision.
Indonesia’s signing of a free trade agreement with the Russia-driven Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in December 2025 demonstrates an effort to diversify its economic channels. Neraca reported on this agreement. Subianto even invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit Indonesia, which Putin accepted. Detik reported on this invitation and acceptance.
For the Kremlin, Indonesia’s continued openness signals a geostrategic win, particularly after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin in 2023. The ICC details the warrant.
However, the ongoing invasion of Ukraine raises concerns. Jakarta should consider Russia’s stability and its history of unfulfilled investment promises. United24 provides analysis on Russia’s current situation, and CEIAS discusses potential issues with Indonesian-Russian partnerships.
Days of the Eagle
Relations with the US form another pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The free trade agreement between Indonesia and Washington, inked on February 20, 2026, was positioned by Jakarta as a pragmatic economic achievement. The Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat highlighted this perspective. However, some observers question whether the outcome truly reflects an equal balance of interests. The Jakarta Globe reported on these concerns.
Indonesia’s involvement in the US-led Board of Peace and discussions surrounding potential normalization with Israel, if Palestine gains statehood, have also sparked debate. The Jakarta Globe covered Prabowo’s statements on this issue. However, Indonesia decided to put discussions related to the Board of Peace on hold after the US and Israel attacked Iran in March 2026. Antara Aceh reported on this decision.
This combination of economic concessions and diplomatic flexibility toward Washington can be seen as a tactical victory for the US. However, perceptions carry strategic weight, and the US probe against Indonesia on forced labor, initiated on March 12, 2026, demonstrates that even close partners face scrutiny. The Jakarta Globe reported on this probe. While Indonesia continues to adhere to the trade deal, Malaysia canceled its similar agreement with the US, and the EU halted trade deal talks. Reuters covered these developments.
Great Expectations
Across these relationships—China, Russia, and the US—a consistent pattern emerges: Indonesia opens up space for interaction. In the short term, this increases bargaining power and minimizes dependence. However, expanding access also creates a more complex configuration of expectations. China seeks to fulfill its designs in the South China Sea, the US expects dominance in the Indo-Pacific, and Russia seeks to expand its networks in the Global South.
Managing these expectations requires strong institutional coupling, diplomatic capacity, interagency coordination, clarity of national priorities, and the ability to read the dynamics of the international system. This is challenging for Indonesia, which has struggled with coordination problems. Research highlights these challenges.
As great power rivalries intensify, pressure on countries in the middle may increase. Indonesia’s strategic location makes it Asia’s biggest geopolitical prize. Foreign Policy emphasizes this point.
The strategic question for Indonesia is not simply whether multi-alignment is feasible, but how to manage the consequences of this expanding geometry of geopolitical access. Jakarta must remember that, if external expectations grow faster than its management capacity, its position can shift from a space for maneuver to a boiling point of pressure.
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