A number of thoughtful observers argued President Donald Trump would not pursue regime change in Venezuela. I was never convinced. On our podcast and in private conversations with experts and political leaders alike, I have been predicting that he would go for it. I also thought it was a bad idea, and I still think so.

After a U.S. snatch-and-grab operation of Nicolás Maduro, who ruled Venezuela as a dictator, under the cover of a night of airstrikes, the question has been answered. In remarks to the world today Trump stated that the United States would “run” Venezuela and oversee a political transition. In response to a question from a member of the press, he stated “we are not afraid of boots on the ground.” Still, me being right is not what’s engaging or vital here. I have gotten Trump wrong on some other big calls. I bet I will again in the future. Prediction in foreign policy is a humbling business.

The really interesting question is this: Why do so many national security minds keep misreading Trump? This is not about partisan wish-casting or bad commentary. many of the people who were confident that Trump would not pursue regime change in Venezuela are smart, seasoned analysts who understand military power, electoral and bureaucratic politics, and American foreign policy history. And yet they were wrong.

I can come up with five reasons they got it wrong. And taking these reasons on board are important for understanding what happens next.

Reason 1: Assuming Trump Has a Doctrine We Can Recognize

There is a powerful impulse among the political and expert classes to map presidents onto familiar strategic categories. People in Washington like doctrines because they make the world legible. They give them models to make predictions: Realists avoid regime change. Jacksonians retaliate but disengage. Isolationists do not take on new commitments. The problem is that Trump dose not actually fit any of these boxes, yet we’ve seen people call him a realist, Jacksonian, and isolationist, even fairly recently.

Trump may be surrounded by people who have doctrines and ideologies, but since 2016 I have maintained that Trump himself does not have one when it comes to foreign policy. his views are not organized into a coherent theory of international politics, nor are they disciplined by consistent assumptions about power, interests, or restraint.

This makes him unusually hard to read, especially if you have your own strong priors or believe Trump’s priors reliably predict his behavior.

Regime Change Operations: Beyond Traditional Intervention

Conventional thinking about regime change often relies on limited, and perhaps inaccurate, mental models.Many envision large-scale military interventions like those seen in Iraq or Panama. though, a spectrum of options exists, and a more targeted approach might potentially be considered before resorting to full-scale invasion.

The Limitations of Traditional Models

Many analyses of potential regime change operations fall into the trap of assuming a specific, and frequently enough expansive, military footprint. They picture large-scale deployments, beach landings, and prolonged occupations. This stems from a reliance on familiar historical examples. Its crucial to remember that the context of each situation is unique, and past interventions don’t necessarily dictate future actions.

A Spectrum of Options: From Raids to Intervention

Regime change doesn’t always require a massive invasion. There’s a range of possibilities, including:

• Airstrikes: Targeted strikes against key infrastructure or leadership.
• Snatch-and-Grab Operations: Highly specialized operations conducted by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to capture key individuals.
• Decapitation strikes: Focused efforts to remove the leadership of a regime.
• Crisis Response Framing: Presenting the operation as a response to an immediate threat, rather than a purposeful attempt at regime change.

These options represent a middle ground between a limited raid and a full-scale intervention. They can be framed in ways that lower the perceived threshold for action, presenting them as law enforcement, crisis response, or targeted removal of threats.

Lowering the Threshold for Action

Framing an operation as something other than a traditional invasion can considerably impact the decision-making process. by presenting it as a limited, targeted action, leaders may be more willing to authorize it, believing they can avoid a protracted conflict. This doesn’t guarantee a limited outcome,but it influences the initial calculation.

The Importance of Initial Perception

Leaders often initiate the use of force with the belief they can control the escalation and avoid a long-term war. History demonstrates that this belief is not always accurate. Though, for predictive purposes, understanding how a president perceives the initial move is critical. The initial framing of the operation shapes subsequent actions and responses.

Unexecuted Plans and Future Considerations

Reports of planned military operations that have not yet been executed suggest ongoing consideration of various options. The existence of these plans highlights the continued assessment of potential interventions and the evolving nature of strategic thinking.

Key Takeaways

• Traditional models of regime change often overestimate the scale of military intervention required.
• A spectrum of options exists, ranging from airstrikes and special operations to full-scale invasion.
• Framing an operation as a limited action can lower the perceived threshold for authorization.
• Leaders often believe they can avoid long wars when initiating the use of force, but this is not always the case.

Looking ahead, it’s crucial to move beyond narrow conceptions of regime change and consider the full range of possibilities. A more nuanced understanding of these options is essential for accurate analysis and informed decision-making. The future of intervention strategies will likely involve a greater emphasis on targeted operations and strategic framing, rather than large-scale conventional warfare.