Chinese President Xi Jinping Arrives in New Delhi for BRICS Summit
According to East Asia Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to New Delhi in September 2026 for the BRICS summit, which was his first trip to India in seven years and his third time meeting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2024. Although bilateral ties have stabilized following an extended phase of friction, suspicion remains, most prominently within trade and investment channels.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited India in late October 2026, but the trip did not seal a long-awaited trade deal with Washington. Obstacles in the American market have instead driven the capital to forge trade pacts with the United Arab Emirates, Australia, the European Free Trade Association, the United Kingdom, Oman, the European Union, and New Zealand in order to guarantee market access. These agreements have moved slowly, carving out sensitive sectors and offering modest commitments on services and investment.
Domestic Business Lobbying Drives Polyalignment Strategy
Aaron Magunna argues that India’s foreign policy is not a calculated strategy to balance relations on a crowded global stage. Instead, this polyalignment is driven by the competing interests of powerful domestic business groups whose influence has grown under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Pressure from corporate interest groups has led to the relaxation of several measures designed to decouple India from China, such as limits on joint ventures and Chinese capital.
Even so, the easing remains modest. Most of India’s restrictions on Chinese investments remain active, and New Delhi continues to impose higher tariff and non-tariff measures on products originating from China, which include a rising number of anti-dumping cases alongside quality control orders. Chinese FDI in India amounted to just US$6.5 million in 2025, as Chinese firms directed their overseas production capacity toward Southeast Asia. In July 2024, BYD launched its inaugural Southeast Asian factory in Thailand, coming a year after security concerns prompted New Delhi to turn down the company’s proposal for a US$1 billion facility in India. Since May 2026, Chinese proposals worth around US$500 million have been registered following a selective easing of investment restrictions.
Competing Priorities in Trade and Regional Frameworks
Thomas Asplund-Meinecke, William B Smith, and Shiro Armstrong contend that seeing China solely as a competitor misses its complementary role in Indian industrial capabilities. The flipside of India’s trade deficit with China is capital and intermediate goods imports, which make domestic firms more productive and competitive abroad. Barriers to those imports shelter upstream firms while raising costs for downstream exporters who compete with Chinese goods in foreign markets.
Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal addressed domestic concerns about strong demand for Chinese goods during the Diwali festive season, noting that change must come through a stronger sense of nationalist spirit and consumer preference for locally made products. Goyal emphasized that India is a democracy and cannot use force to stop consumers from buying imported products, pointing to Japan and South Korea as examples of domestic preference, as reported by Business Today.
Upcoming Regional Reviews and 2027 Timelines
New Delhi could manage economic friction by engaging through multilateral frameworks such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. RCEP’s joint committees and annual ministerial meetings provide a standing forum to press Beijing on unfair practices. New Delhi will have a natural opportunity to rejoin the pact it bypassed in 2019 when the agreement undergoes its initial comprehensive evaluation in 2027.
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