The April 27, 2026, collision between a passenger train and a commuter rail service at Bekasi Timur Station, which resulted in 16 fatalities, was compounded by a series of communication breakdowns and signal visibility issues, according to an investigation report released on September 28, 2026, by the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT). Investigators documented a sequence of operational failures involving emergency protocols, signal displays, and coordination between train controllers as the disaster unfolded.
Communication Failures During the East Bekasi Collision Emergency
The sequence of events began on the evening of April 27, 2026, when a Commuter Line train, designated KA 5181B, collided with an electric battery-powered vehicle, or taxi, at a level crossing on Jalan Ampera near Bekasi Timur Station. According to the KNKT report, the engineer of KA 5181B contacted the Southern Centralized Train Travel Controller (PPKP Selatan) using an individual push-to-talk button on the microphone rather than activating the emergency call function. This radio communication process and subsequent clarification regarding the affected track took three minutes and 20 seconds. Investigators noted that audio from the train’s radio had a relatively low volume because the distance between the sound source and the microphone exceeded recommended guidelines, which reduced the clarity of the transmission for the controller.
A separate communication failure occurred involving a second train, KA 5568A, which was stopped at Track 1 of Bekasi Timur Station. KNKT found that the engineer of KA 5568A attempted to contact PPKP Selatan twice without receiving a response. The first call occurred while the controller was managing the aftermath of the taxi collision at the level crossing, and a second call followed 47 minutes later—corrected in reports to indicate a short interval of 47 seconds—as a crowd gathered near the tracks. Because the engineer used an individual call instead of an emergency signal, no emergency notification appeared on the controller’s console. Consequently, information that KA 5568A was immobilized due to the crowd did not reach the controller, who was occupied with the first incident.
Signaling Gaps and Contributing Factors Identified by KNKT
The KNKT investigation cataloged 60 findings grouped into six contributing factors affecting the safety of the rail network during the incident. These factors included signaling anomalies, emergency communication hurdles, coordination breakdowns among controllers, and procedures regarding braking. At Bekasi Station, an interlocking facility where signaling is managed via a control console with a visual display unit (VDU) in the controller’s room, investigators observed that the VDU did not display indicators for Block Signals and Auxiliary Signals. Security camera footage showed that an express train, KA 4B Argo Bromo Anggrek, passed through Track 3 past an exit signal showing a green aspect that subsequently turned red once the track ahead was occupied.
As KA 4B traveled toward Bekasi Timur Station, it encountered an Auxiliary Signal (UB104) and a Block Signal (B104), the latter of which showed a red aspect when the train passed. KNKT emphasized that identifying these contributing factors was intended to improve safety procedures rather than assign administrative, civil, or criminal liability. The findings highlight systemic vulnerabilities in how emergency information is transmitted and displayed across control desks during simultaneous operational disruptions on the rail network.