The Pentagon’s Munitions Surge Problem: Why the U.S. Can’t Rely on Crisis-Only Production
The U.S. Military’s ability to rapidly produce and deliver munitions during crises has become a defining vulnerability in an era of great-power competition. While the Ukraine war exposed the Pentagon’s struggles to surge production in time to meet urgent demands, new analysis reveals a critical truth: the success—or failure—of these efforts is determined long before the first shots are fired.
Contrary to popular perception, the emergency authorities and supplemental funding unleashed after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 played a secondary role in determining which munitions could be produced at scale. Instead, production lines that had been maintained, supply chains that were actively managed, and workforce skills that were preserved—all decisions made years earlier—dictated whether the U.S. Could meet the moment. For weapons like the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors, pre-conflict investments paid dividends. For others, like the Stinger missile, decades of neglect left the Pentagon scrambling to restart production lines with an obsolete workforce and missing parts.
This article examines the structural barriers to munitions surge, why improvisation fails in crises, and the concrete steps the Pentagon must take—before the next conflict—to ensure it can meet demand when it matters most.
Why Surge Production Isn’t a Crisis-Only Problem
The Pentagon’s experience supporting Ukraine from 2022 to 2024 demonstrated sharp variation in surge performance across weapon systems. Some munitions, such as 155mm artillery rounds and air intercept missiles, saw meaningful production increases. Others, like the Stinger and Javelin, struggled to ramp up despite similar levels of emergency funding and acquisition flexibilities.
Pre-Crisis Decisions Determine Surge Success
- Active production lines: Weapons like the GMLRS, which had maintained steady procurement and capital investments before 2022, could surge production by 40% within two years. The new Patriot production facility in Huntsville, Alabama, opened in late 2022—just in time for Ukraine’s needs—because its construction began in 2019.
- Obsolescence management: The Patriot program’s proactive efforts to mitigate component obsolescence paid off, while Stinger production stalled due to decades of inactivity, leaving critical parts unavailable and skilled workers retired.
- Supply chain readiness: Munitions that benefited from pre-conflict stockpiling of long-lead materials (e.g., circuit chips for missiles) avoided delays when surge production began.
Emergency funding alone cannot overcome structural gaps. The Defense Production Act authorities and supplemental appropriations used to accelerate production after 2022 were applied uniformly across programs. Yet, their impact varied dramatically because the underlying conditions—workforce availability, facility capacity, and supply chain health—were not uniform.
The Three Structural Barriers to Surge Capacity
To effectively surge munitions production, the Pentagon must address three persistent challenges:
A Playbook for Surge Readiness
The Pentagon’s 2026 Acquisition Transformation Strategy identifies surge capacity as a priority, but translating strategy into action requires:
1. Define Surge—And Plan for It
Surge is not the same as peacetime production or full-scale mobilization. It requires:
- A time-bound increase in production/delivery rates without mobilizing the entire civilian economy.
- Clear trigger points (e.g., adversary actions, intelligence warnings) to activate surge plans.
- Pre-identified bottlenecks and mitigation strategies for each critical munition.
Action: The Pentagon should:
- Adopt a standardized definition of surge across services and acquisition regulations.
- Prioritize the 14 munitions identified by the Munitions Acceleration Council for surge planning.
- Conduct annual surge exercises (modeled after 1978’s “Nifty Nugget”) to test industrial base responsiveness.
2. Keep Production “Warm”
Instead of treating munitions production as a reactive measure, the Pentagon should:
- Mandate minimum production baselines for critical weapons (e.g., 10% of peak capacity).
- Leverage foreign military sales (FMS) to smooth demand signals (e.g., FMS to Ukraine and Taiwan).
- Explore co-production agreements with allies (e.g., NATO’s munitions-sharing initiatives).
3. Enhance the Surge Toolkit
Current authorities (e.g., Defense Production Act) are necessary but insufficient. The Pentagon should:
- Push for Congressional authorization to stockpile long-lead materials without requiring an end-item procurement.
- Include surge clauses in all munitions contracts, specifying:
- Maximum feasible production rates.
- Sub-tier supplier dependencies.
- Penalties for missed surge targets.
- Expand the Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network to include commercial manufacturers capable of rapid conversion.
Lessons for the China Contingency
A potential conflict with China would dwarf the munitions demands of Ukraine. The Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative allocates $300 billion over five years to modernize forces in the Indo-Pacific, but production capacity remains the Achilles’ heel.
Critical Munitions for a China Fight
Based on NDU analysis, the following systems would require immediate surge planning:
| Munition | Current Production Rate | Projected Surge Need | Key Bottleneck |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) | ~500/month | 5,000+/month | Propulsion system suppliers, workforce shortages |
| Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) | ~300/month | 2,000+/month | Semiconductor shortages, testing delays |
| Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) | ~200/month | 1,500+/month | Radar component lead times |
| 155mm Excalibur | ~1,000/month | 10,000+/month | Powder and propellant supply |
Strategic Implications
If the U.S. Fails to prepare:
- Allies face unmet demands: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea would struggle to resupply without U.S. Munitions.
- Adversary advantages: China’s rapid production of drones and missiles could outpace U.S. Surge efforts.
- Economic strain: Relying on crisis-only production would require unsustainable defense budgets, diverting funds from modernization.
Key Takeaways
- Surge success is pre-determined: Weapons that surged in Ukraine did so because of pre-conflict investments, not emergency funding.
- Workforce and supply chains are the real bottlenecks: Skilled labor and specialized parts cannot be improvised in a crisis.
- Boom-or-bust procurement fails: Treating munitions as a discretionary line item creates readiness gaps.
- A playbook is needed: The Pentagon must define surge, plan for it, and exercise it—before the next conflict.
- Allies are part of the solution: Foreign military sales and co-production can smooth demand and lower costs.
FAQ: Munitions Surge and the Defense Industrial Base
Q: Why can’t the U.S. Just use commercial manufacturers to produce munitions?
A: While initiatives like the Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network are promising, most munitions require specialized tooling, classified materials, and stringent quality controls that commercial firms lack. Even if converted, ramp-up times would still be measured in months, not days.
Q: How much would it cost to “keep production warm”?
A: Estimates vary, but maintaining 10% production capacity for critical munitions could add $5–10 billion annually to the defense budget. However, this is far cheaper than the $1 trillion+ the U.S. Spent on Ukraine-related military aid and replenishment since 2022.
Q: What’s the biggest risk if the U.S. Doesn’t prepare?
A: Strategic surprise. If the Pentagon cannot surge production in a crisis, it risks:
- Running out of critical munitions mid-conflict.
- Forcing difficult trade-offs (e.g., prioritizing Taiwan over Europe).
- Losing the tempo of operations to adversaries with more agile supply chains.
Q: Are there examples of successful surge planning?
A: Yes. During Desert Storm (1991), the U.S. Surged production of 155mm artillery rounds by pre-positioning stockpiles and contracting with commercial foundries. More recently, the GMLRS surge succeeded because of pre-conflict investments in modular production pods.
The Clock Is Ticking
The U.S. Defense industrial base is at a crossroads. The lessons of Ukraine are clear: munitions surge is not a crisis-only capability—it’s a peacetime requirement. The choices made in the next two years will determine whether the Pentagon can meet the demands of a potential China conflict or be forced into a reactive, improvisational posture.
Success requires:
- Political will: Congress must fund multiyear procurement and authorize long-lead material stockpiling.
- Industrial discipline: The Pentagon must treat surge planning as a core competency, not an afterthought.
- Allied cooperation: NATO and Indo-Pacific partners must align procurement needs to achieve economies of scale.
As NDU’s Bryce Loidolt warns: “The industrial outcomes of the next crisis will already have been set by choices made years in advance.” The time to act is now.