Jakarta seeks a central role in postwar Gaza, exposing the diplomatic and security hurdles of forming a force acceptable to israelis, Palestinians, and global stakeholders while questions persist over Indonesia‘s readiness.

Indonesia has unexpectedly moved to the centre of international diplomacy over Gaza’s future, propelled by its long peacekeeping record, Muslim-majority identity, and the rare legitimacy it holds across regions that seldom agree. That shift accelerated after the United Nations Security Council voted 13-0 on Monday to endorse a US-drafted Gaza plan backed by President Donald Trump.

The resolution authorizes an International Stabilization Force for gaza and creates a “Peace Board” chaired by President Trump to guide reconstruction, according to the official UN vote record.Russia and China abstained but did not veto, signaling broad recognition that many world powers want an actor outside entrenched regional rivalries to take the lead.

For Washington and several Arab governments, that actor is increasingly Indonesia. The world’s fourth most populous country is home to more Muslims than any other nation.

Indonesia began laying the groundwork months ago. The Jakarta Post reported in mid-2024 that officials were studying possible humanitarian or peacekeeping roles in Gaza.”The president’s view is that we should prepare up to 20,000 of our soldiers, with an emphasis on medical and construction capabilities,” indonesia’s defense minister, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, said. He stated this on Nov. 14 after meeting the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces in Jakarta.

He emphasized that any deployment would require a clear international mandate, meaning formal UN authorization. The Defense Ministry maintains that Indonesia is ready to contribute a substantial contingent if requested, and the Indonesian National Armed Forces Peacekeeping Center, Indonesia’s military training facility for international missions, continues to train personnel.

Prabowo’s September speech at the UN General Assembly signaled indonesia’s growing diplomatic ambitions. He called for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would establish an autonomous Palestinian state while guaranteeing israel’s security, declaring that “the two descendants of Abraham must live in reconciliation, peace, and harmony.” The reference to Abraham, revered by both Jews and Muslims, was a carefully crafted signal of Indonesia’s willingness to play a bridging role.He has since emerged as a partner in American efforts to end the war.

But the gap between Prabowo’s high-profile diplomacy and Indonesia’s actual readiness is stark and possibly risky.”there’s almost no debate happening in Indonesia about the Gaza peacekeeping mission,” Dinna Prapto Raharja, an associate professor of international relations and executive director of the Jakarta-based think tank Synergy Policies, told The Media Line. “Prabowo rules with the support of almost all political parties, including Islamic parties that used to be in opposition, and they keep telling voters he’s got this handled. But no detailed plans have been presented.”

She said Prabowo’s foreign-policy approach relies more on personal diplomacy and direct leader-to-leader relationships than on institutional readiness such as wargaming scenarios or consulting with military planners. “Gaza’s at the top of the list right now because of the moment,but no detailed plans have been announced.”

Many of Prabowo’s earlier humanitarian ideas revealed similar gaps between declaration and execution. When he proposed transferring injured Palestinians to Indonesia for medical treatment, he never clarified how Indonesia would prevent displacement or guarantee that those patients could actually go back to Gaza. The goal was to ensure those patients wouldn’t become permanent refugees unable to return home. His suggestion of using Galang Island, a former Vietnamese refugee camp site in Indonesia’s Riau Islands province, triggered questions in the Indonesian media about whether the facilities had adequate medical capacity, how it would be funded, and whether it complied with international law.

Indonesia Could Lead Gaza Stabilization Force, But Challenges Remain

U.S. officials,in multiple off-the-record briefings,have made clear they seek postwar stability in gaza but will not deploy a large American force,unlike the massive troop commitments seen in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. “Washington hasn’t been willing to deploy large forces abroad for decades,” Chuck Freilich,a former Israeli deputy national security adviser and senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies,told The Media Line. “Bush, Obama, Biden, and Trump were similar in thier reluctance.Since Turkey is unacceptable to Israel [due to Turkish President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and support for Hamas], Jakarta becomes the better option.”

Israeli cooperation, though, hinges on the command structure. The key question is who will make decisions on the ground. “Any stabilization force would ultimately have to be headed by the United States, not U.S. troops, but at least American commanders,” Freilich said.”Israel will not accept a mission lead by a Muslim state. Turkey is unacceptable. Indonesia is acceptable, but not as the leader.” Israel might tolerate Indonesian personnel on the ground, but only if Americans are directing operations.

many observers also misinterpret the mission’s requirements, freilich added. “This would not be a peacekeeping force,” like the lightly armed UN troops who monitor ceasefires between parties that have already stopped fighting. “It would be a peace-enforcing mission if the goal is to disarm Hamas. That is essentially a war-fighting mandate,” meaning combat operations to seize weapons and potentially engage armed groups that resist, “and I do not see any country eager to take it on. I’m not optimistic.”

The bottom line: Indonesia could be entering a shooting war, not a peacekeeping mission.

Inside gaza,the postwar habitat presents the biggest challenge. The war has weakened Hamas militarily, but the group continues to operate and maintains notable popular support in parts of Gaza.Islamic Jihad,the Popular Resistance Committees,clan-based armed groups,and other armed factions maintain separate command structures and weapon stockpiles. Humanitarian organizations report that local governance has partially collapsed and conventional family clans, extended kinship networks that predate Hamas, now mediate disputes, control access to aid distribution points, and provide what little security structure remains in many neighborhoods.

“Palestinians in Gaza do not judge an international force simply by its nationality,” Adel al-Ghoul, a Palestinian political analyst and head of the Paris Center for Security Studies and International Relations, told The Media Line. “What matters is the function of that force and its behavior on the ground,” whether it protects Palestinian civilians,facilitates reconstruction,or simply acts as an extension of israeli security control.

Indonesia begins with a built-in advantage compared to Western or Arab countries. “Indonesia has a very positive image,” al-Ghoul said. “It has no relations with Israel, it has supported Palestine diplomatically for decades, and it is indeed seen by Palestinians as a major Muslim country not aligned with Western agendas.” Unlike Egypt or Jordan, which have peace treaties with Israel, or Gulf states that have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, Indonesia has maintained consistent rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood without compromising that position.

People in Gaza want aid, reconstruction, and human security, not guardianship.