The Philippines’ Balancing Act: Navigating the South China Sea Code of Conduct
The Philippines, as 2026 ASEAN chair, faces a complex strategic dilemma in its pursuit of a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. While aiming to establish clear rules for maritime conduct, Manila’s simultaneous pursuit of “hard balancing” – strengthening alliances and military capabilities – creates obstacles to achieving a lasting agreement with China. This approach, intended to deter aggression, risks escalating tensions and limiting diplomatic flexibility.
Understanding Hard Balancing in the South China Sea
In maritime security, “hard balancing” refers to a state’s efforts to counter a perceived threat by expanding its maritime capabilities, deepening formal alliances, and reinforcing coercive diplomacy . While defensive in intent, such measures often trigger reciprocal countermeasures, leading to a spiral of mistrust and confrontation .
Obstacles to the COC: Reputational Costs and Alliance Signalling
Manila’s efforts to bolster its maritime capabilities through closer ties with the United States raise the reputational cost of making concessions during COC negotiations. Beijing prefers bilateral dispute settlement, and a strong US-Philippines alliance signals a commitment to a firmer stance . A joint statement following the 12th Philippines–United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue on February 16, 2026, pledged to strengthen the alliance and re-establish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific . This commitment includes over 500 military and security activities throughout the year, including large-scale iterations of Exercise Balikatan .
This visible security cooperation potentially limits Beijing’s room for maneuver. A meaningful COC requires calibrated ambiguity and flexibility, which grow harder to achieve when a strong alliance posture raises the reputational barrier to compromise . China’s expanding coast guard and maritime militia forces, alongside the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – the world’s largest by ship count with over 370 battle force ships and submarines – further complicate the situation. Many Chinese scholars view intensified US–Philippines alignment as part of a broader containment architecture .
Multilateral Defence Networks and Externalisation
Beyond the US, the Philippines has expanded security cooperation with Japan, Australia, and European partners, including a new bilateral defence cooperation agreement with Italy signed during the Munich Security Conference 2026 . Japan has transferred coastal surveillance radar systems and signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement , while Australia is investing in infrastructure upgrades and joint maritime patrols . France and Canada have also increased their participation in Balikatan, making it the largest multilateral exercise in its history .
While these partnerships enhance Manila’s maritime capacity, they risk reinforcing China’s narrative of external interference in the South China Sea disputes . This could lead Beijing to delay or dilute the COC.
Mutual Nationalist Pressures
Hard balancing, coupled with coercive transparency initiatives, intensifies nationalist sentiment in both the Philippines and China . In the Philippines, increased maritime capacity raises domestic expectations for resolving disputes, while political fragility – evidenced by recent impeachment attempts against the vice president – limits room for compromise. Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party faces domestic pressure to demonstrate strength and protect its strategic objectives, which extend beyond the South China Sea .
A Path Forward
While deterrence remains essential, a functional COC requires complementary diplomatic adjustments. This includes sustaining bilateral channels with China alongside ASEAN processes, sequencing negotiations for flexibility, and moderating confidence-building efforts in emerging maritime areas . Vietnam offers a potential model, balancing island building with sustained engagement and lower-profile messaging with China, including joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin .
Without such calibration, hard balancing may stabilize tensions but is unlikely to deliver a COC that serves the Philippines’ interests and preserves ASEAN’s credibility.
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