Southeast Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Edging Closer in an Era of Geopolitical Churn

Over the past three decades, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly expanded its geographical footprint, membership and functional cooperative activities. This article provides a detailed examination of Southeast Asia’s engagement with the organisation.

Introduction

In 2026, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will celebrate its 30^th anniversary. Founded in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, known then as the Shanghai Five, the organisation’s initial remit was firmly centred on Central Asia and a common commitment to improve cross-border security and combat transnational threats. In 2001, the group added Uzbekistan and formally changed its name to the SCO. However, its geographical footprint and mandate remained largely unchanged.

Over the next two decades, the SCO inducted new members and extended participation to observers and dialogue partners. As geopolitical tensions between China and Russia and the West intensified in the 2010s, the organisation emerged as a building block in Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to create an alternative global governance structure. The SCO also began to promote greater economic connectivity among its member states and dialogue partners.

Southeast Asia’s engagement with the SCO has been slow to develop, primarily due to the organisation’s focus on Central Asia and limited opportunities for interaction until the dialogue partnership option became available in 2008. The SCO and ASEAN only established institutional linkages in 2005, with just three ASEAN member states – Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos – becoming dialogue partners between 2015 and 2025.

In September 2025, the SCO held its 25^th summit in Tianjin, China. This event marked a strengthening of ties between the Eurasian bloc and Southeast Asia, with six regional states and the ASEAN secretary-general in attendance. The Tianjin Summit demonstrated Southeast Asia’s increasing interest in closer cooperation with the SCO due to intensifying global geopolitical churn. Despite its institutional shortcomings, the SCO is viewed by some Southeast Asian countries as a useful hedging option in an era of major power competition, providing opportunities for closer trade and investment ties, especially with China and India. However, other Southeast Asian countries have refrained from pursuing closer ties due to frayed relations with China, negative perceptions of the organisation, or a lack of perceived benefits.

The Evolution of the SCO

Five years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the Shanghai Five. Its primary role was to improve collective security by tackling separatism, terrorism, and extremism. In 2001, Uzbekistan became the sixth member, and the organisation formally became known as the SCO. Mongolia became an observer in 2004, followed by Afghanistan in 2012. In 2008, the SCO invited applications for dialogue partners. In 2017, it inducted India and Pakistan, followed by Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.

As with other multilateral forums, the expansion of the SCO’s membership created challenges. The organisation’s geographical focus expanded beyond Central Asia to include countries with disparate interests. Rivalries between member states, such as India and Pakistan, and India and China, made consensus decision-making more difficult. As the SCO’s membership expanded, its institutional capacities and financial resources remained limited. Western countries often dismissed the SCO as an ineffectual forum composed of autocratic countries. Although the reality is more complex, some countries have been reluctant to pursue closer relations for fear of offending their Western partners.

Despite its institutional shortcomings, the SCO is viewed by some Southeast Asian countries as a useful additional hedging option in an era of major power competition.

In September 2025, China’s President Xi Jinping hosted the SCO’s annual summit in Tianjin. The meeting was attended by over 20 world leaders. At a time of heightened geoeconomic tensions, the meeting provided an opportunity for Xi to project an image of China as a champion of globalisation and stability. Beijing declared its full support for the multilateral trading system and called for eliminating unilateral practices. Xi announced China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which promotes sovereign equality, international rule of law, and multilateralism. He also called for establishing an SCO Development Bank and closer cooperation in energy, green industry, and the digital economy. Xi also hosted the inaugural SCO Plus meeting, attended by members, observers, dialogue partners, and guests, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The Tianjin Summit garnered more international attention than any previous SCO meeting.

Southeast Asia’s Engagement with the SCO

Southeast Asia’s engagement with the SCO has been slow, due to the organisation’s focus on Central Asia and limited interaction opportunities until 2008. Only three countries – Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos – have grow dialogue partners between 2015 and 2025. Those countries’ desire to interact with the SCO reflects their close relations with Russia and China rather than burgeoning diplomatic or trade links with Central Asia.

ASEAN

ASEAN’s institutional engagement with the SCO has been distant, consisting primarily of meetings between the two organisations’ secretary-generals. A 2005 Memorandum of Understanding called for cooperation on transnational crime, but little practical cooperation has occurred. Several reasons account for the thin institutional links: the limited economic footprint of Central Asian states in Southeast Asia, differing security dynamics, and the Central Asian states’ limited interest in closer ties with ASEAN. The SCO’s official languages, Russian and Chinese, also pose a communication barrier. Most importantly, ASEAN is reluctant to dilute its centrality in the Indo-Pacific region by associating with institutions dominated by Russia and China.

Cambodia

In 2015, Cambodia became the first Southeast Asian country to become an SCO dialogue partner. Phnom Penh views the SCO as an essential venue to promote its development through closer trade and investment ties, especially with China.

Laos

Laos applied to be a dialogue partner in 2024, accepted at the Tianjin Summit. Laos is keen to take advantage of the SCO’s trade and investment networks to reduce its economic dependence on China.

Myanmar

Myanmar has strengthened ties with Russia and China since the 2021 military takeover. China has supported the junta and intervened to broker ceasefires with ethnic armed groups. Myanmar is pushing China to restart Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects. At the SCO Plus meeting, China’s Foreign Ministry referred to the coup leader as “acting president” and endorsed Myanmar’s bid for full membership.

Indonesia

President Prabowo Subianto has pursued a more proactive foreign policy, strengthening ties with both Russia and China. Indonesia attended the SCO Plus meeting but has not applied for partnership or full membership.

Malaysia

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim attended the SCO Plus meeting and praised the SCO’s achievements. However, Malaysia prioritises strengthening ASEAN and has not applied to become an SCO partner.

Vietnam

Vietnam has adopted a multidirectional foreign policy known as “bamboo diplomacy”. Vietnam accepted China’s invitation to the SCO Plus meeting but remains cautious about closer ties, citing its relationship with China and its commitment to other multilateral forums.

Conclusion

Intensifying major power rivalry and dissatisfaction with the current international order have led some Southeast Asian countries to pay the SCO more attention. Closer engagement is driven by the Global South’s frustration with perceived inequalities and the emergence of a multipolar system. The SCO is seen as an additional economic network.

However, the SCO’s importance to Southeast Asia should not be exaggerated. The bloc’s institutional weaknesses, disparate membership, and perceived anti-Western bias will act as barriers to closer engagement. ASEAN remains the priority for most regional states.