South China Sea Strategy: Use It or Lose It

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Strategic Presence: The South China Sea Power Balance

The South China Sea remains a primary theater of geopolitical friction, where competing territorial claims and the enforcement of international maritime law define regional stability. According to the U.S. Department of State, the People’s Republic of China’s expansive maritime claims lack a basis in international law, specifically the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Regional stability now relies on a “use it or lose it” posture, where naval presence and freedom of navigation operations serve as the primary mechanisms to prevent the normalization of unilateral territorial control.

Why Maritime Presence Matters in the South China Sea

Why Maritime Presence Matters in the South China Sea

Maintaining a consistent naval and coast guard presence is the central strategy for regional powers to uphold the rules-based order. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reports that China has constructed significant military infrastructure on reclaimed features in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These outposts allow for persistent monitoring and power projection that challenge the sovereignty of neighbors, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

When a nation fails to patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it risks a “salami slicing” strategy—a term used by security analysts to describe small, incremental actions that avoid triggering a major conflict while gradually changing the status quo. By maintaining a presence, nations demonstrate the political will to enforce their maritime rights, making it harder for claimants to assert de facto control over disputed waters.

The Role of Freedom of Navigation Operations

The Role of Freedom of Navigation Operations

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) are a critical tool for the United States and its allies to challenge excessive maritime claims. The U.S. Department of Defense conducts these operations to assert the right of all nations to traverse international waters.

These operations are not merely symbolic. They serve three distinct functions:

  • Legal Assertion: They formally contest claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS.
  • Deterrence: They signal that maritime corridors will not be closed to international traffic.
  • Allied Reassurance: They provide a security guarantee to regional partners who lack the independent naval capacity to challenge larger powers.

Current Tensions and Regional Responses

Current Tensions and Regional Responses

Recent confrontations near the Second Thomas Shoal highlight the volatility of the region. The Philippine Coast Guard has frequently reported dangerous maneuvers by Chinese vessels, including the use of water cannons and high-intensity lasers against resupply missions.

These incidents represent a departure from historical norms of naval engagement. While international law governs the behavior of vessels at sea under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), enforcement remains difficult when one party refuses to recognize the underlying territorial rulings, such as the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision that invalidated China’s “nine-dash line” claims.

Comparison of Strategic Approaches

Why China will LOSE the South China Sea

| Strategy | Goal | Primary Actor |
| :— | :— | :— |
| Presence Operations | Maintain visibility and deter encroachment. | Philippines, Vietnam, U.S. |
| Infrastructure Expansion | Establish permanent de facto control. | China |
| Freedom of Navigation | Uphold international legal access. | U.S., UK, Australia, Japan |

What Happens Next

The trajectory of the South China Sea depends on the balance between diplomatic engagement and military posturing. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to negotiate a Code of Conduct with China, though progress has been slow due to disagreements over the legal binding nature of the agreement.

Observers expect that if diplomatic channels fail to produce a binding agreement, the region will see an increase in “grey zone” activities—actions that fall below the threshold of declared war but effectively alter the maritime landscape. Regional powers will likely continue to modernize their coast guards and seek deeper security partnerships with external powers like the United States, Japan, and Australia to maintain a credible deterrent force in the face of shifting maritime realities.

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