Russia’s Expanding Influence in Bolivia: Wagner, Lithium, and the SVR

As Bolivia’s political landscape fractured, the Kremlin sought to bolster its ally, President Luis Arce, ahead of crucial elections. A new dossier reveals a concerted effort involving former Wagner Group operatives and Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR) to increase Moscow’s influence in the resource-rich nation, particularly concerning its vast lithium reserves.

The Kremlin’s Play for Bolivia

In July 2024, a team of seven Russian “specialists” arrived in La Paz with the stated aim of “stabilising” Arce’s government [1]. This intervention occurred during a period of significant challenges for Bolivia, including economic difficulties, fuel shortages, wildfires, and widespread protests. Inflation had reached its highest level since 2008, and the ruling Movement for Socialism (MAS) party was internally divided between President Arce and his predecessor, Evo Morales.

Bolivia’s strategic importance to Russia lies in its possession of 21% of the world’s lithium deposits, a critical mineral for next-generation technologies. The Kremlin views Bolivia as a key ally in the region, and securing access to its resources is a significant geopolitical objective.

From Wagner to the SVR: A Shift in Tactics

Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Russia’s SVR assumed control of Wagner Group’s African operations, extending its reach to Latin America, including Bolivia [2]. The SVR now manages Wagner’s influence arm, known as Africa Politology or “The Company,” which employs nearly 100 consultants. Between 2024 and 2025, teams were deployed to countries including Angola, Argentina, and Bolivia.

A 54-page report, “Strategy for increasing Russia’s influence in Africa,” prepared by operatives linked to the Wagner group in August 2023, details plans for cooperation with the SVR [1]. At least 17 of the operatives deployed to Bolivia by 2024 had prior connections to Wagner.

Key Operatives and Their Roles

Sergei Sergeyevich Klyukin, described as the “curator” of the Bolivian mission, joined “the Company” in 2018 after working as a political consultant in Russia. He previously headed the Company’s “sociological department” in Sudan from 2018 to 2020 [1]. In January 2024, Klyukin oversaw monitoring and analysis of the situation in 15 countries, managing 34 “sociologists” or “political specialists.”

Sergei Vasilievich Mashkevich was responsible for expanding the Company’s presence in Africa and Latin America, coordinating the Bolivian team between July and September 2024. Dmitry Viktorovich Volkov led the Bolivia mission on the ground, having previously led information operations in Mali.

Bolivian Context and Geopolitical Interests

Bolivian security analyst Jorge Santistevan notes that Bolivia is a target for intelligence agencies from various nations due to its natural resources, including lithium and rare earths, and its involvement in the narco-trade [1]. He highlights that the Russia-Bolivia alliance is driven by geopolitical interests, specifically access to lithium.

In September 2024, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom, Uranium One Group, signed a $1 billion contract with the Arce government to produce 14,000 annual tonnes of lithium carbonate in Salar de Uyuni [1]. Simultaneously, Russia began shipping diesel to Bolivia, providing a crucial lifeline to a country facing fuel shortages.

Information Warfare and Internal Influence

A Russian operative’s document dated August 17, 2024, revealed that 67.2% of Bolivians did not trust President Arce [1]. The document proposed establishing an “anti-crisis information centre” within the Ministry of Communications, an “anti-crisis headquarters” to address food supply issues, and a purge of Arce’s government. Around this time, Arce did remove the ministers of Oil, Labour and Development, although a reshuffle was already anticipated.

The proposed communication structure included a media officer reporting daily to the President, responsible for media relations and analytics, and a secretariat to oversee press secretaries and state media. Implementation of these measures reportedly began on July 29, 2024.