Beijing Launches Military Purge Under Xi Jinping

From Jan. 1 through Feb. 9, official announcements from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and local watchdog bodies reported at least 25 high-ranking figures under investigation, review, or punishment, including Zhang and Liu.

Five ministerial-level figures were also implicated, including Emergency Management Minister Wang Xiangxi, former Justice Minister Tang Yijun, and former Inner Mongolia Party Secretary Sun Shaocheng. Former Bank of China vice president Lin Jingzhen was expelled from the Party, while former China National Nuclear Corporation general manager Gu Jun was also linked to investigations.

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The remaining officials came from local governments, finance, state-owned enterprises, the military, courts, research institutes, and universities.

A Jiangxi-based financial scholar surnamed Hong told overseas Chinese media that the cases were not confined to one sector, adding: “I’ve heard they are conducting retrospective investigations everywhere, some say going back 10 years, others say 20 years. I’ve also heard some officials’ illicit funds reached tens of millions of yuan, while others reached hundreds of millions or even over a billion.”

Clearing out obstacles

Why such an unusually dense crackdown so early in the year? A source identified only as Mr. Ye said the pace was rare in recent years: “Generally they would not announce so many cases so intensively. Officials also consider public reaction; if too many are arrested, people start wondering why all the corrupt officials are inside the Party.”

He noted that in the past, only a handful of ministerial-level officials were investigated annually, often around the Two Sessions. “Now five officials were investigated in a single month… the rhythm is different. It may be meant to intimidate high-ranking cadres.” Mr. Ye added that handling vice–state-level cases before the Two Sessions sends a clear signal: “The timing is very explicit, clearing obstacles for personnel arrangements before this year’s meetings.”

An independent scholar using the pseudonym Cui Kai said the fallout has reached into the CMC command system and may not stabilize until later in the year.

Falling dominoes

Following the sudden downfall of Zhang and Liu, outside observers have searched for clues about internal power struggles. On Feb. 4, the NPC Standing Committee held an emergency session. Some believed Xi Jinping intended to strip Zhang and Liu of their delegate status to provide procedural legitimacy. Instead, the session removed three executives from major defense-industrial conglomerates, while Zhang and Liu’s delegate status remained untouched.

Commentator Tang Jingyuan argued this was Xi’s second procedural setback, showing significant internal resistance. He said Xi underestimated the backlash after Zhang’s detention: “Everyone stays silent, no one expresses support.”

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Another analyst, Zhang Tianliang, suggested the three defense executives were closely tied to benefit exchanges during Zhang Youxia’s tenure overseeing equipment development.

Days earlier, on Jan. 27, Premier Li Qiang spoke at a State Council anti-corruption meeting, warning: “Corruption remains severe and complex; major cases occur frequently; the amounts involved continue to rise; especially the problems exposed in fields such as military-industrial central enterprises are shocking, causing enormous harm to the Party and the country’s cause.”

Some observers interpreted this as indirectly pointing to Zhang Youxia’s case as rooted in defense-industry corruption. Li added: “We must always maintain a high-pressure stance against corruption, not stop for a single step, not yield even half a step, and absolutely show no mercy.”

Sweeping purges underway

After Zhang and Liu were officially announced to have fallen on Jan. 24, PLA Daily published a harsh editorial accusing Zhang of “five serious” offenses. Yet subsequent commentaries gradually shifted away from political condemnation toward framing the case as corruption.

A Jan. 31 article stated: “Resolutely investigating Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is a major victory in the anti-corruption struggle.” But critics argue corruption is often a political pretext. Hudson Institute scholar Yu Maochun wrote in The Washington Post that in communist dictatorships, “the greatest crime is not corruption… but making the top leader unable to sleep.”

Notably, more than two weeks after Zhang’s downfall, there has been no broad public show of support from major PLA commands or military academies. On Feb. 9, PLA Daily published an article stressing: “All actions must obey the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.”

Taiwanese analyst Shen Ming-shih observed: “PLA Daily always calls for what is lacking… the first issue is that morale is unstable.” For now, Xi’s repeated appeals for military loyalty appear to be met with silence, raising further questions about the depth of support behind the purge.