The UK’s Digital ID scheme: Three Reasons Why Policymakers Have It Wrong
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In late September, the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced his government’s plans to introduce a new digital ID scheme in the country to take effect before the end of the Parliament (no later than August 2029). The scheme will, according to the Prime Minister, “cut the faff” in proving people’s identities by creating a virtual ID on personal devices with information like people’s name, date of birth, nationality or residency status, and photo to verify their right to live and work in the country.
This is the latest example of a government creating a new digital system that is fundamentally incompatible with a privacy-protecting and human rights-defending democracy.This past year alone, we’ve seen federal agencies across the United States explore digital IDs to prevent fraud, the transportation Security Administration accepting “Digital passport IDs” in Android, and states contracting with mobile driver’s license providers (mDL).And as we’ve said many times, digital ID is not for everyone and policymakers should ensure better access for people with or without a digital ID.
But instead, the UK is pushing forward with its plans to rollout digital ID in the country. Here’s three reasons why those policymakers have it wrong.
Digital ID allows the state to determine what you can access, not just verify who you are, by functioning as a key to opening-or closing-doors to essential services and experiences.
Mission Creep
In his initial announcement, Starmer stated: “You will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have digital ID. It’s as simple as that.” Since then, the government has been forced to clarify those remarks: digital ID will be mandatory to prove the right to work, and will only take effect after the scheme’s proposed introduction in 2028, rather than retrospectively.
The government has also confirmed that digital ID will not be required for pensioners, students, and those not seeking employment, and will also not be mandatory for accessing medical services, such as visiting hospitals. But as civil society organizations are
The Looming Threat of Digital ID
The UK government is pushing forward with plans for a digital identity scheme, promising streamlined access to services. But beneath the veneer of convenience lies a system riddled with potential for exclusion, discrimination, and mass surveillance. While proponents tout efficiency, a closer look reveals a dangerous power grab that threatens fundamental freedoms.
Exclusion by Design
One of the most immediate concerns is accessibility.A meaningful portion of the population lacks the necessary tools and resources to participate in a fully digital system.Those without consistent internet access, smartphones, or conventional forms of identification risk being left behind. This isn’t a hypothetical problem. For example, UK institution Big Brother Watch reported that about only 20% of global Credit applicants can use online ID verification methods.
These individuals should not be an afterthought attached to the end of the announcement for further review. It is indeed essential that if a tool does not work for those without access to the array of essentials, such as the internet or the physical ID, then it should not exist.
Digital ID schemes also exacerbate other inequalities in society, such as abusers who will be able to prevent others from getting jobs or proving other statuses by denying access to their ID. In the same way, the scope of digital ID might potentially be expanded and people could be forced to prove their identities to different government agencies and officials, which may raise issues of institutional discrimination when phones may not load, or when the home Office has incorrect information on an individual. This is not an unrealistic scenario considering the frequency of internet connectivity issues, or circumstances like passports and other documentation expiring.
Any identification issued by the government with a centralized database is a power imbalance that can only be enhanced with digital ID.
Attacks on Privacy and Surveillance
Digital ID systems expand the number of entities that may access personal information and consequently use it to track and surveil. The UK government has nodded to this threat. Starmer stated that the technology would “absolutely have very strong encryption” and wouldn’t be used as a surveillance tool. Moreover, junior Cabinet Office Minister Josh Simons told Parliament that “data associated with the digital ID system will be held and kept safe in secure cloud environments hosted in the United Kingdom” and that “the government will work closely with expert stakeholders to make the programme effective, secure and inclusive.”
But if digital ID is needed to verify people’s identities multiple times per day or week,ensuring end-to-encryption is the bare minimum the government should require. Unlike sharing a National insurance Number, a digital ID will show an array of personal information that would otherwise not be available or exchanged.
This would create a rich environment for hackers or opposed agencies to obtain swathes of personal information on those based in the UK. And if previous schemes in the country are anything to go by, the government’s ability to handle giant databases is questionable. Notably, the eVisa’s multitude of failures last year illustrated the harms that digital IDs can bring, with issues like government system failures and internet outages leading to people being denied entry to the country.