Yemen’s Recent Government Faces Challenges Amid Regional Tensions

As the conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran enters its third week, Yemen’s internationally recognized government confronts significant hurdles both domestically, and internationally. The new administration must strive to establish control amidst growing concerns that the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels, who control the capital Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, will become further involved in the escalating regional conflict.

Recent Political Turmoil

The new government emerged from a period of two months of instability beginning in late 2025. Forces loyal to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), previously partners in the fight against the Houthis, clashed, fracturing the governing coalition established in 2022. The primary combatants were forces supporting the internationally recognized government, backed by Riyadh, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist group supported by Abu Dhabi.

In early December 2025, the STC, while a member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), moved to seize control of large portions of Hadramawt, Yemen’s largest province. After negotiations failed, Saudi Arabia organized a campaign by PLC-allied forces that expelled the STC from these areas and most of its positions in southern Yemen. Saudi airstrikes on STC positions in Hadramawt accelerated their defeat. This outcome led to a political reshuffle: the cabinet was dissolved, two PLC members, including STC head Aidrous al-Zubaidi and his deputy, were replaced, and a new government was formed under Prime Minister Shaye’ al-Zindani, with Riyadh’s support.

These events unfolded against the backdrop of over a decade of civil war that has divided Yemen between the Houthi rebels and government-linked forces controlling the south, east, and parts of the west. Since 2017, the anti-Houthi camp has been internally divided, with the STC advocating for southern secession while formally participating in the national governing framework supported by the Saudi-led coalition.

A Reset of Influence

The confrontation in Hadramawt deepened existing fissures. Saudi Arabia consolidated control of the anti-Houthi front, supporting the forces that pushed back the STC’s gains and reasserted central authority in non-Houthi-held areas. The UAE responded by withdrawing its military assets from southern Yemen. Divisions within the STC also widened, with some leaders voting to dissolve the council while in Riyadh for Saudi-brokered talks, while others, including Zubaidi, opposed this decision. The formation of the new government represents both an attempt to reunify the anti-Houthi camp and a shift in the balance of influence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in Yemen.

Following its formation, cabinet members were sworn in at the Yemeni embassy in Riyadh. Their return to Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, was delayed due to security concerns, coinciding with protests by STC supporters opposing the new government.

Government Structure and Stability

The new cabinet, formed in early February under Prime Minister Zindani, is the largest since 2015, comprising 35 ministers, including several ministers of state without portfolio. It builds upon the internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, which fled Sanaa when the Houthis took control in 2014, and its successors, including the PLC. Officials describe its composition as moving beyond rigid quotas, but it still reflects an effort to balance political, social, and geographical interests. The appointment of three women as ministers marks a first in recent years.

The balance of power within the PLC has shifted significantly after the events in Hadramawt. The STC, initially emboldened by its territorial advances, emerged weaker militarily and politically. The UAE’s troop withdrawal further reduced the STC’s leverage. Riyadh now exerts greater influence over the PLC’s political direction, and the new government reflects this realignment of Yemeni power dynamics.

The cabinet’s ability to remain cohesive will depend on its ability to unite behind a single agenda. Previous governments struggled because ministers often prioritized their political blocs over a shared government program, exacerbating fragmentation. To avoid repeating this pattern, the new leadership must translate its inclusive composition into coherent decision-making, limit the use of ministries for patronage, and deliver early, visible improvements in service provision and economic management.

Challenges Facing the New Leadership

Yemen’s new leadership has a limited opportunity to address institutional divisions and public services issues, but it faces a significant credibility deficit. While the Saudi-backed campaign against the STC enabled the government to assert control over all non-Houthi-held territory for the first time in years, it required external assistance. Many Yemenis view the government reshuffle as a reconfiguration of elite power under Saudi sponsorship, potentially undermining its legitimacy.

Instability in parts of the south further complicates the situation. Despite their military defeat, the STC retains fighters and social networks, and protests by its supporters indicate that the secessionist cause persists. Security remains precarious in areas such as Aden and al-Dhale, and a heavy-handed response to dissent could reinforce the perception that the new government represents a victory over, rather than accommodation with, southern constituencies.

Economic constraints pose a significant challenge. Oil exports have been suspended since 2022 due to Houthi attacks on port facilities in Hadramawt and Shebwa. State revenues have been severely reduced, limiting the government’s ability to pay salaries, stabilize the currency, and restore basic services. The current regional conflict is likely to worsen economic conditions, increasing pressure on the government to deliver services and humanitarian aid.

The Conflict with the Houthis

Much depends on the evolving situation surrounding the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran. Prior to this conflict, the situation between the government and Houthi rebels was largely a stalemate, with sporadic skirmishes interrupting a tense, informal truce since 2022. Between October 2023 and October 2025, the rebels occasionally targeted shipping in the Red Sea and Israel, ostensibly to support Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza. These actions were partly political, positioning the Houthis as champions of the Palestinian cause and portraying their adversaries as subservient to U.S. And Israeli interests. Quiet talks between the Houthis and Saudis continued during this period, maintaining the informal truce but yielding no substantial results.

The potential for the Houthis to enter the broader Middle East conflict remains a key concern. The reasons for their restraint thus far are speculative, potentially linked to Iran’s strategy of incrementally increasing pressure and preserving sources of leverage. If further provoked, Iran might encourage its Houthi allies to attack international shipping in the Red Sea or targets in Gulf states, aiming to disrupt maritime and land corridors. Such actions could have devastating consequences for Yemen’s already fragile economy and potentially reignite civil war.

The government is unlikely to pursue large-scale military engagement with the Houthis if it can avoid it, given its weakened fiscal base and the need to consolidate authority within the PLC and stabilize controlled areas. Riyadh is also likely to favor de-escalation and a managed political track over further military intervention.

The Role of External Actors

External actors can play a crucial role in stabilizing Yemen. Saudi Arabia, as the government’s primary backer, can discourage renewed intra-Yemeni rivalries. The UAE, despite its military withdrawal, retains influence with southern factions and can help prevent further polarization. Supporting the new government’s efforts to improve governance and deliver basic services could help build confidence and address local grievances. Reviving the roadmap talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, which began in 2023, could offer a path toward a lasting resolution.