Cuba’s Energy Crisis Fuels Intelligence Gathering by China and Russia

Just 90 miles from Florida, Cuba’s energy crisis has evolved into a national security concern, attracting strategic opportunism from Beijing and Moscow as they seek to expand their intelligence-collection capabilities. While Havana struggles with maintaining power, China and Russia are stepping in, not as charitable donors, but as strategic players.

The Escalating Energy Crisis

The State Department reported in February 2026 that “scheduled power cuts occur daily, and unscheduled outages persist throughout Cuba.” Cuba’s thermoelectric plants, many decades old, are operating at just 34 percent capacity. Five of eight Turkish-leased floating power plants departed Cuban ports in February after Havana failed to meet payment obligations.

The crisis intensified after the U.S. Seized control of Venezuelan oil operations in early January. Mexico had become Cuba’s primary supplier, shipping approximately 20,000 barrels per day through September 2025. However, under pressure from the Trump administration, which threatened tariffs, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced a temporary halt to shipments in late January. Shipments had already decreased to around 7,000 barrels per day, leaving Cuba without oil imports for the first time in years.

China’s Expanding Digital Footprint

China’s presence in Cuba has grown significantly, particularly in telecommunications and digital infrastructure. Satellite imagery identifies at least four Chinese-linked signals intelligence facilities: Bejucal, Wajay, and Calabazar near Havana, and a new site at El Salao near Santiago de Cuba.

As Cuban telecommunications companies struggle with outdated equipment and power failures, Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE have positioned themselves as the only viable solution. These companies are not simply providing hardware; they are installing the networks through which Cuba’s internet traffic flows. The El Salao site features a circularly disposed antenna array, effective at determining the origin and direction of high-frequency signals, allowing Beijing visibility into U.S. Military communications and operations up to 9,300 miles away.

MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, home to U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command, is less than 300 miles from Cuban shores. Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, Naval Air Station Key West, and other military installations across Florida, Georgia, and Alabama are also within range. The advantage over satellite surveillance is significant, as Cuban facilities provide a constant presence with line of sight to key U.S. Facilities.

In February 2025, Chinese Ambassador Hua Xin and Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel announced China would construct 55 solar plants by the end of 2025, with an additional 37 planned by 2028, adding over 2,000 megawatts of capacity. This dependency gives Chinese intelligence services access to Cuban government communications, military installations, and infrastructure systems.

Russia’s Renewed Military Presence

Russia’s intelligence footprint in Cuba has intensified. In March 2025, Russia and Cuba signed a military cooperation agreement ratified by Russian lawmakers in October. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that between 6,000 and 7,000 Cubans are fighting as mercenaries in Russia’s war against Ukraine, the second-largest foreign contingent after North Korea’s approximately 12,000 troops.

Russian intelligence personnel and equipment are embedded within ostensibly civilian infrastructure projects. Russian engineers provide maintenance to Cuba’s power grid, bringing more than just technical skills. When radar systems at Cuban air defense installations fail, Russian specialists provide upgrades with built-in collection capabilities. Russia has also increased naval port calls in Havana, allowing for personnel rotation.

Washington’s Dilemma

The expansion of Chinese and Russian intelligence capabilities in Cuba presents a challenge for Washington. Continued U.S. Pressure may make it difficult for China or Russia to assist Cuba, but the infrastructure crisis complicates any potential diplomatic opening. The intelligence collection capabilities established by Beijing and Moscow will persist long after the current blackouts end.

The opportunities stemming from Cuba’s military and political alignment with China, longstanding working relationship with its military and other personnel, geographical proximity, and other benefits are significant.