The South China Sea Code as a Test of ASEAN’s Agency The South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) has returned to the diplomatic forefront, propelled by the Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN chairmanship and the familiar rhetoric of urgency: momentum, acceleration, and deadlines. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat held on 29 January 2026 in Cebu City, foreign ministers reiterated their ambition to establish an effective and substantive code consistent with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Meanwhile, China continues to attend ASEAN meetings and endorse the goal of concluding negotiations. Yet Southeast Asia should resist the tendency to treat the COC as a finish line. The code is neither a sovereignty settlement nor a mechanism capable of reconciling incompatible territorial claims. Rather, it is a stress test of ASEAN’s cohesion and its capacity to convert institutional habits into meaningful restraint — in a maritime space where power asymmetries persist and coercion is often calibrated to remain below the threshold of open conflict. ASEAN’s influence has rarely depended on hard power. Instead, it has rested on its ability to shape regional habits through institution-building and diplomatic convening. Even as this institutional logic remains intact, its limits are repeatedly tested on the South China Sea. ASEAN must therefore navigate internal diversity and external pressure simultaneously. Internally, member states remain divided between claimants and non-claimants, divisions that have at times constrained the bloc’s ability to adopt collective positions. Externally, China continues to combine diplomatic leverage with coercive actions at sea, this includes repeated water-cannon incidents against Philippine vessels near Second Thomas Shoal in 2024. The COC, in Indonesia’s view, should also lay out clear measures to forestall and prevent any escalation among the law enforcement agencies of the claimant states and China. Indonesia, as the current chair of ASEAN, is pushing for substantive progress on the COC this year, emphasizing that the code must be more than a symbolic gesture — it must deliver tangible mechanisms to prevent incidents at sea from spiraling into broader conflict. ASEAN and China agreed in 2002 to work toward a code of conduct. The expectation was that shared rules would promote predictability and restraint. More than two decades later, negotiations remain unfinished. The prolonged process reflects the limits of ASEAN’s consensus-based diplomacy, where any single member state can block progress. Despite these challenges, the stakes remain high: around one-third of global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, including the Malacca Strait, which links East Asia with markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Instability in this space would have direct consequences for global supply chains, energy flows, and economic growth. As ASEAN seeks to finalize the COC under Indonesia’s leadership, the true test lies not in the text of the agreement itself, but in whether member states can uphold its principles when faced with real-world provocations. The code’s success will ultimately be measured not by its signing, but by its ability to withstand the pressures of competing claims and great power rivalry — and to serve as a living framework for peace and stability in one of the world’s most critical waterways.
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