Syria’s Fragile Transition and the Resurgence of ISIS

Less than a month after the repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, Syria’s transitional president Ahmad al Sharaa launched an offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), triggering Arab tribal defections and a rapid loss of territory. This development has jeopardized the containment of the Islamic State (ISIS) in northeast Syria by disrupting intelligence networks, widening security gaps, and degrading control over detention facilities and refugee camps. The most acute consequence has been mass escapes from the al-Hol refugee camp, raising concerns about a potential resurgence of the terrorist group.

The Repeal of the Caesar Act and Shifting Dynamics

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, also known as the Caesar Act, sanctioned the Syrian government, including President Bashar al-Assad, for war crimes against the Syrian population. The Caesar Act aimed to hold the Syrian government and its allies – Russia and Iran – accountable for atrocities and discourage foreign investment that could support the regime. However, on December 18, 2025, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 repealed the Caesar Act. [2] This repeal occurred shortly before al Sharaa’s offensive, signaling a shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Security Gaps and the Al-Hol Camp Crisis

Al Sharaa’s offensive began in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh, prompting a withdrawal of SDF forces to Kobani and Hasakah, resulting in the loss of approximately 80 percent of their territory. A U.S.-mediated ceasefire reached on January 30th has, so far, held, accompanied by a phased integration framework. Prior to the offensive, the SDF held roughly 9,000 ISIS fighters in detention facilities, even as al-Hol housed approximately 24,000 individuals, primarily women and children, and al-Roj camp held over 2,000 more.

The withdrawal of SDF forces from al-Hol on January 20th led to a breakdown in security, with reports of organized convoys smuggling residents out of the camp, some reportedly ending up in Idlib. The foreign nationals’ annex, holding over 6,000 third-country nationals, was among the first areas emptied. Al-Hol has since been officially closed, and al-Roj camp is also expected to close soon. Approximately 15,000–20,000 individuals are now estimated to be at large following the camp’s collapse.

Washington’s Shifting Strategy and U.S. Withdrawal

Despite these developments, Washington is pursuing a Damascus-centered approach, pressing the SDF toward integration and treating the central state as the successor partner. The premise is that a unified Syrian state under al Sharaa can absorb the burden of countering ISIS and enable a U.S. Military drawdown. The U.S. Has handed over the al-Tanf garrison to Damascus and is withdrawing its remaining 1,000 troops from Syria within a month.

Challenges to Stabilization and the Risk of Radicalization

Syria remains in a fragile state of transition, lacking the institutional depth and local security architecture required for durable stabilization and ISIS containment. This transition is further undermined by al Sharaa’s coercive consolidation and the extremist character of segments of his security apparatus, intensifying sectarian polarization. This creates a permissive environment for radicalization that ISIS can exploit to infiltrate state structures and rebuild networks.

The composition of the nascent security apparatus is a concern, with minority communities largely excluded and religious instruction reinforcing loyalty and ideology over professionalism. The apparatus is dominated by hardline Islamist factions, with instances of fighters displaying ISIS insignia and sectarian war crimes reported. A lack of accountability and curbing of sectarian incitement further exacerbates the problem.

ISIS’s Positioning for a Resurgence

In its first audio message in two years, ISIS spokesperson Abu Hudhayfah al Ansari called on supporters to target al Sharaa’s government and denounced him as an apostate aligned with Washington. This message, released shortly after the mass escapes from al-Hol, signaled a latest phase of operations in Syria, indicating that the group is positioning itself to exploit the weakened containment architecture. ISIS is likely to rely on mobile cells operating across Syria, conducting terrorist attacks, ambushes, and assassinations, rather than attempting to restore a territorial caliphate.

Conclusion

The current conditions point to a fragmented security landscape in a region structurally vulnerable to ISIS’s reconstitution. Washington’s priority should be preventing Syria’s transition from sliding back into renewed conflict. Sustained pressure on Damascus to move toward inclusive governance and accountability within the security forces is crucial. Without enforceable conditions, Syria risks a transition that either fractures, allowing ISIS to expand, or consolidates into an exclusionary Islamist order, with consequences extending beyond Syria’s borders.