U.S. Lifts Sanctions on Syrian Chemical Weapons Experts, Raising Proliferation Concerns

In a move that has sparked concern among nonproliferation experts, the Trump administration lifted sanctions on 266 employees of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) – the heart of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program – as part of a broader effort to normalize relations with Damascus following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 . The decision, made in June 2025, has raised questions about accountability for past chemical weapons attacks and the potential for future proliferation.

Normalization and Sanctions Reform

The lifting of sanctions occurred alongside a 180-day suspension of the Caesar Act, legislation imposing tough sanctions on Syria over alleged human rights abuses under the former Assad regime . The Trump administration stated the move was intended to give Syria “a chance at greatness” and facilitate the rebuilding of the war-ravaged country. Syria has too joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State .

The Scientific Studies and Research Center and Chemical Weapons

Established in the 1970s, the SSRC was tasked with developing advanced weapons, including chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Institute 3000, a division within the SSRC, was specifically responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons such as sulfur mustard, sarin and VX nerve agents . The center also developed various chemical munitions, including aerial bombs and missile warheads.

Previous Sanctions and Chemical Attacks

The United States first sanctioned the SSRC in 2005 for its role in Syria’s weapons of mass destruction programs. Following the start of the Syrian civil war, the Assad regime reportedly used chemical weapons against its own people, conducting over 340 attacks that resulted in at least 1,500 deaths and 12,000 injuries. The sarin attack on Ghouta in August 2013, which killed over 1,000 civilians, remains the deadliest single day of the conflict.

International Efforts and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Under pressure from the United States and Russia, Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013 and agreed to eliminate its chemical weapons program. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verified the destruction of Syria’s declared stockpile in 2014. However, the Assad regime continued to employ improvised chemical weapons containing chlorine in rebel-held areas. The sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun in 2017 confirmed suspicions that Syria had hidden some of its chemical arsenal, as the sarin used bore a unique signature developed by Syrian researchers .

The 2017 Sanctions and Subsequent Reversal

In response to the Khan Sheikhoun attack, the Trump administration struck the airbase from which the attack was launched and imposed sanctions on 271 SSRC employees, citing their expertise in chemistry and their involvement in the chemical weapons program . These sanctions were part of a broader effort to hold the Assad regime accountable for its human rights violations and deter the spread of chemical weapons. However, in June 2025, as part of the sanctions overhaul, almost all of these individuals were removed from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals List.

Concerns and Implications

The removal of these individuals from the sanctions list has raised concerns about proliferation risks and accountability. The Specially Designated Nationals List is used internationally to identify individuals and entities with whom businesses should not transact. Removing these scientists eases their ability to conduct financial transactions and travel, potentially increasing the risk of them contributing to future weapons programs. While the Trump administration has not provided a public explanation for the delisting, some speculate it was due to a rushed process or a belief that Syria’s chemical weapons program is no longer a threat . Some sanctioned individuals, like Dr. Said Said and Dr. Hala Sirhan, remain sanctioned by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Australia .

The decision highlights the require for careful coordination of sanctions policy with allies and partners to ensure that efforts to facilitate reconstruction do not inadvertently undermine nonproliferation goals.