## UN Snapback Sanctions Return to Iran, Further Jeopardizing Nuclear Deal
President Masoud Pezeshkian insists Iran has no intention of building nuclear weapons, calling the sanctions “unfair and illegal.” But the move marks another blow to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal meant to cap iran’s enrichment and research while allowing civilian nuclear energy.
Iran accelerated banned nuclear activity after Trump pulled the U.S. out of the deal in 2018, repeatedly dismissing the accord as flawed.
The latest sanctions cut Iran off from global banks, reimpose arms and missile restrictions, and revive asset freezes and travel bans on key officials. Analysts say the measures hit Iran at a fragile moment with its economy shrinking, inflation surging, and the rial collapsing to record lows. Oil sales, foreign investment, shipping, and manufacturing are all expected to take a hit.
The Cipher Brief spoke with longtime Middle East and Energy Analyst Norman T. Roule who formerly served as National Intelligence Manager for iran at ODNI. Roule continues to travel regularly to the region for meetings with high-level officials throughout the Middle East.
Norman T. Roule
Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence manager for Iran (NIM-I)n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.
The Cipher Brief: Why are snapback sanctions different from other sanctions already imposed on Iran?
Roule: First, we should touch on what this means for the regime. The sanctions hit Iran at one of its most fragile moments since the late 1980s.the government remains unpopular to an unprecedented degree. Virtually every economic indicator in Iran is poor. Its national security architecture of militias, foreign proxies, Russia, China, and the Revolutionary Guard failed during the recent conflict with Israel and the U.S. The main driver of the regime is to maintain stability as it completes transitions to the post-revolutionary generation of leadership. Despite the absence of large-scale protests, destabilizing national unrest could occur at any time.
Over the past few months, Iran’s diplomats have used the prospect of a nuclear deal and the possibility of sanctions relief as a source of hope for the Iranian people. The return of UN sanctions strips Tehran of one of its few remaining political assets.
The primary difference between the latest sanctions and U.S. sanctions is that these measures are binding on all 193 member states of the United Nations. Iran will, of course, do everything it can to evade sanctions. Russia, China, North Korea, venezuela, and other Iranian partners who already have a history of violating Iran sanctions are unlikely to enforce these sanctions with enthusiasm.
However, unlike U.S. sanctions, which they have argued could be ignored as they were imposed only by Washington, these sanctions are imposed by the United Nations. This will make it harder for these countries to involve other countries in their own violations. Likewise, it makes it much easier for the U.S. government to seek compliance worldwide due to the legal and reputational risks associated with countries and businesses that we might approach on this issue.The Cipher Brief: Can you discuss the specific sanctions and your assessment of their likelihood of success?
Rou
Iran Faces Economic Pressure After Recent Events
Iran claimed – and likely overstated – attracting around $5.5 billion in foreign investment. This already small figure will likely decrease further.
Let’s examine the sectoral impacts.
Shipping costs for Iran will probably increase substantially. A critically important portion of Iran’s seaborne trade faces new cargo inspections,bans on dual-use goods,insurance difficulties,and potential port servicing complications.
Manufacturing and mining will experience impacts on both imports and exports due to pressures on supply chains and financing. This affects trade with Europe, hinders Iran’s efforts to trade with Africa, and complicates relations with Iraq.
Although Iran’s defence industry may not participate in trade shows, its existing trade in drones and light arms will likely continue. Current clients – Russia, Sudan, several African countries, and reportedly Venezuela and Bolivia – may ignore sanctions due to a lack of alternative suppliers and animosity toward the West.
the impact of sanctions on Iranian oil sales to China will be the most significant, tho arduous to assess, in the coming months. Beijing and Tehran deliberately obscure their payment relationship, and China already imposes tough terms on Iran. China will likely use this situation to offload more goods, machinery, and technology onto the Iranian market and potentially negotiate a larger price discount for the oil it purchases.
Tehran will likely rely more on intermediaries, smaller banks outside international monitoring, and shell firms, increasing costs.Chinese oil sales could also contract. Beijing, anticipating this outcome, has been building its reserves, and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates can fill the production gap, though they won’t discount their oil to match Iran’s prices.
The Cipher Brief: What are Iran’s likely next moves? Is diplomacy dead? What do you say to those who believe military action is expected?
rolled: Iran’s response will likely follow a predictable pattern. Iranian leaders will use Western media to present their perspective, projecting confidence, defiance, and minimizing the impact of sanctions. Upon returning home, they will reaffirm their commitment to continuing nuclear work.
Even within Iran, debate likely continues regarding the program’s future, with several options under consideration.Tehran’s close ties with Moscow and Beijing suggest it will seek their involvement in its programs. iran might offer IAEA access at some point to gain international acceptance. Three possible paths could emerge in the coming months.
The most probable option involves Iran rebuilding a modernized version of the enrichment and conversion facilities destroyed in the Twelve-Day war. This process will be expensive and could take years, depending on the number and location of facilities. This aligns with Iranian rhetoric but risks military attack and extended sanctions. Lengthy construction also delays economic benefits.
Tehran could reduce the risk of attack by granting the IAEA access to the sites or involving Russia or China in their operation and construction. Such an option,particularly if it includes advanced centrifuges,would allow Iran to retain the capability to produce highly enriched uranium.